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Preface

Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga), a leading spokesman on national
defense, and the late Senator Dewey Bartlett (D-Okla), in an important
1977 report to the Senate on "NATO and the New Soviet Threat"
stated, "NATO is the most important of all of America's military
alliances. If there is one place outside the territorial confines of the
North American continent where our interests may be regarded as truly
vital, that place is Europe."
The future peace of the world depends upon credible deterrence
by the NATO Alliance. To be credible in the eyes of potential enemies,
especially the Warsaw Pact, NATO forces must be supportable so as to
defend successfully against any attack.
Successful defense depends upon an effective line of communica
tions through which support flows, both forward and retrograde. The
most effective, efficient, and viable line of support extends from the
Iberian Peninsula (Spain and Portugal) across France to the East-West
borders in Germany.
Portugal is one of the major anchors of that line of communications.
A look at the globe of the world shows the importance of Portugal.
Its location, along with that of Spain, shows how it can control the
Mediterranean Sea and the South-Central Atlantic Ocean. The addition
of its Azores Islands provides one of the keys to support of NATO by air
as well as its tremendous advantages by sea.
In this address, Professor Whitehurst has given greater visibility to
an element of NATO's deterrence plan which has, over the years,
become obscure. Yet it is no less important to the fundamental strength
of NATO's plan of deterrence, or combat support, should deterrence
not succeed.
Portugal is, and must remain, an essential factor in any NATO plan
for preservation of peace and freedom.

LTG Joseph M. Heiser, Jr.
USA (Ret)
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Thurmond Institute Lectures

Portugal's Strategic Importance
In NATO Defense Planning
Scores of press releases, news stories, and in-depth analyses over
the past five years have focused on the ability (or inability) of NATO
forces to turn back a Soviet attack on Western Europe. The title of a
December 1983 analysis in U.S. News and World Report fairly summed
the problem.
NATO'S DILEMMA: STOPPING
RUSSIA WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Building conventional weapons to de
fend Europe seems simple and sensible.
But it's easier said than done. 1
This lecture addresses the question: What happens if a Soviet at
tack is successful and Warsaw Pact forces overrun Western Europe to
the English Channel and north of the Pyrenees, i.e., the German
Federal Republic, France, and the Low Countries, and in the process
outflank Italy, Greece, and Turkey? Figure 1 depicts NATO and Soviet
positions at the end of such a hypothetical "Phase I" of the Battle for
Europe.
Assuming the war continues, two countries that have not figured
largely in analyses to date become vitally important- NATO members
Portugal and Norway. This lecture considers the possible role of one of
these countries, Portugal. 2
While I cannot treat in detail every aspect of the role Portugal
might play, I can identify and discuss some critical issues. A major one
is what the other European NATO nations and the United States might
do to enhance Portugal's contribution to NATO's defense.

Spain
One cannot, however, consider the role of Portugal in an Iberian
theater of war and not Spain.
In June 1982, Spain became a member of NATO. But with a
change of governments in December of the same year (center-right to
socialist), Spain's integration into NATO was halted and the issue made
subject to a future referendum. Since the new government took office,
it has obliquely linked Spain's membership in the European Economic
Community and membership in NATO, i.e., EEC membership first,
then NATO, perhaps. At present, the only tie between Spain and
NATO is United States bilateral agreements with Spain granting U.S.
access to Spanish naval and air bases under strictly specified conditions.
3
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FIGURE 1.
End of Phase I-Battle for Europe
Thus, it is recognized that the 350,000-man Spanish armed forces
would be invaluable in a worst-case NATO scenario. But, given the
continuing unrest in Northern Spain, and popular support for Spanish
membership in NATO being about evenly divided, it is deemed pru
dent, at least for the moment, to focus on Portugal as the rock upon
which a last European defense line might be built.
The renowned military analyst, B. H. Liddell Hart, once noted that
men "talk much about war, but rarely do they talk of it - as a subject
so serious as to be worth the serious study of every thinking man and
4

woman." 3 Here we will not only talk of war, but of the real possibility
of initially losing major campaigns as was so often the case of the Allies
in World War II. Such a discussion will hardly make anyone's day, but
then that is not the purpose of the lecture.
Portugal and NATO

In December 1983, the United States and Portugal renewed an
agreement that will allow American planes to continue using the air
base at Lajes in the Azores. The pact will run for seven years, and by its
terms the United States will compensate Portugal with military and
economic aid valued at $145 million annually. 4 In addition to the
Azores agreement, negotiations for additional U.S. base facilities in
southern Portugal will take place. A large part of U.S. military aid will
be used to reequip Portugal's armed forces, a need which was stressed
by Mota Pinto, Portugal's Vice Premier and Minister of Defense, during
the 1983 Lajes negotiations. 5
The need to modernize the Portuguese armed services is not
disputed, especially the need to bring more advanced aircraft into the
inventory. Table I shows the composition and equipment of Portugal's
military forces in 1983.
But while the need for modern military equipment is accepted, a
more fundamental issue is Portugal's role in overall NATO war plan
ning. Defense Minister Pinto believes that "NATO reaps a con
siderable benefit from Portugal's strategic location" and, in fact, that
his country is a part of NATO's first line of defense. 6 Pinto's assessment
that a major contribution of Portugal to NATO defense posture is its
strategic location is correct. Not agreed to, however, is that this
strategic importance is limited to the well understood and conven
tional reasons usually cited, i.e., the geostrategic importance of Por
tugal's ocean ports and air bases (including those in the Azores and
Madeira) in maintaining sea control in the North Atlantic, its proximity
to the vitally important approaches to the Western Mediterranean
(Straits of Gibralter), and its role as a stabilizing influence on the Iberian
peninsula and Northwest Africa. 7
Equally important is the part Portugal could play in the in-depth
NATO defense strategy, in particular, the role it might play as a last line
of European defense. As noted earlier, this latter role is predicated on a
worst-case scenario in which the Soviet Union launches a broad front
attack across West Germany which NATO forces are unable to con
tain. The ultimate result would be Allied armies being driven across the
English Channel and from Europe north of the Pyrenees. 8
Were such to occur, could Portugal, in fact, be a viable last line of
European defense? Would Portugal see itself in this role? If the requisite
military capability is not there, what can be done? What might the
United States and other NATO members contribute?
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TABLE I
Organization/Equipment of Portugal's Armed Services, 1983
Army (Active Duty Personnel, 41,000)
12 Infantry Regiments
2 Cavalry Regiments
1 Commando Regiment
2 Field Artillery Regiments
1 Anti Aircraft Regiment
1 Coastal Artillery Regiment
2 Engineer Regiments
1 Signal Regiment
1 Special Forces Regiment
Navy (Active Duty Personnel, Including Marines, 13,000)
17 Frigates
3 Submarines
10 Large Patrol Crafts
19 Coastal Patrol Crafts
4 Minesweeps
2 LCT, 11 LCM, 1 LCA
Air Force (Active Duty Personnel, including 1,500 Paratroops, 9,500)
3 Fighter Squadrons
1 Reconnaissance Squadron
2 Torpedo Squadrons
3 Search and Rescue Squadrons
2 Helicopter/Utility Squadrons
2 Liaison Squadrons
3 Training Squadrons
Total Combat aircraft = 74*
Source: Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84, p. 90.
*On order: 30 A-7s, 20 TA-4s, 12 A-109s.

Historical Background

Portugal's identification and alliances with the West date back
more than 600 years to 1373 when the first Anglo-Portuguese treaty
was signed in London. 9 Winston Churchill once referred to Portugal as
England's "Oldest Ally." The occasion was the announcement in the
House of Commons in 1943 of an agreement that made facilities
available for British shipping in the Azores. (The United States later
received similar base rights within the framework of the Anglo
Portuguese treaty.)
The 1943 base agreement was essentially one more instance of
active English-Portuguese cooperation in time of adversity, and in a
sense, a century old debt was repaid. In this regard, following the inva
sion of Portugal by Napoleon in 1807, a British expeditionary force was
landed under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley (later the Duke of
Wellington). In a see-saw struggle, major victories at Vimeiro, Talavera,
Torres Vedras, and the retaking of Almeida in 1810 finally forced the
French troops out of Portugal for good. 10
6

In World War I, at England's request, Portugal detained German
ships that were in Portuguese ports, an act which led to a German
declaration of war in 1916. Portugal mobilized some 200,000 men
from which an expeditionary force of 65,000 was sent to France.
Casualties exceeded 4,000 men, not including those sustained in Africa
where Portuguese troops participated in the conquest of Germany's
African colonies of Southwest Africa and Tanganyika.
Although neutral in the second World War, Portugal's act of
friendship toward Britain, already noted, was certainly important in
winning the Battle of the Atlantic. After the war, when the end result of
Soviet expansionism was finally perceived in Western Europe, Portugal
became a founding member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In more recent times, Portugal's support of United States interests was
demonstrated when it allowed American planes engaged in the re
supply of Israel during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War to use the Azores as a
refueling stop. 11 No such support was given by any other European
NATO nation and, in fact, overflight rights for U.S. planes resupplying
Israel were denied by most of them.

The Revolution of the Carnations
When long-time Portuguese Prime Minister Oliverira Salazar was
permanently hospitalized in 1968, some of the more repressive
policies of his administration were relaxed by his hand-picked suc
cessor, Marcelo Caetano. However, it was a case of too little, too late.
A bloodless revolution in 1974 overthrew the Caetano government. As
a symbol of support for the revolution, soldiers in Lisbon put carna
tions in their rifle barrels as well as wore them. Caetano and the Presi
dent of the Republic, America Tomas, were exiled. For a period of one
and a half years, Portugal's politics was strongly influenced by pro
communist General Vasco Goncalves. He was the main political force
behind successive provisional governments and actually headed the
Fifth Provisional Government. He was forced from office in September
1975, and in November a military revolt of the far left was put down.
It was during this period of "Goncalvismo" that NATO Europe
became increasingly concerned about Portuguese participation and
dedication to the Alliance. It is a topic briefly addressed here because
that short interval in Portuguese history tends to be somewhat exag
gerated and basically misunderstood.
The best perspective can be gained by reviewing election results
between April 1975 and April 1983. Table II clearly shows that while
the communists in Portugal may be vocal, they are in a decided minority.
After the 1983 general elections, seats in the Assembly were divided
as follows:
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And while Table .II indicates communist gains, about 4 percent
over an eight-year period, these must be seen in the context of
Portugal's inflation, one of the highest in Western Europe, and the
severe austerity measures imposed by earlier as well as the present
government in attempting to bring about economic stability. That com
munist gains have been so slight in such an economic environment is
quite remarkable.
Another way to gauge the communist influence in Portugal is to
compare their vote-getting appeal with another West European nation
- France. In the April 1981 French presidential elections, the com
munists claimed 15.3 percent of the votes. In the National Assembly
election in June 1981, the communist vote was 16.2 percent. 12 Theim
portant point to note is the relative lack of communist influence on
French national policy when their vote percentage is in the 15-20 per
cent range. In this respect, the Socialist President Francois Mitterrand,
once regarded in some circles as soft on communism, has been quite
willing to challenge the Soviet Union when French national interests
are involved. In the past, he has minced no words about the danger of
the Soviet military buildup.
A fair and supportable conclusion is that Catholic and tradition
bound Portugal is as firmly in the NATO camp as any other West
Europe member country.
TABLE II

Voting Results in Portuguese Elections, 1975-1983
Date

Election for

April 1975

Assembly

April 1976

Assembly

June 1976

Presidential

October 1980

Assembly

December 1980
April 1983

Presidential
Assembly

Party

Non-Communist
Communist
Non-Communist
Communist
Non-Communist
Communist
Non-Communist
Communist
Non-Communist
Non-Communist
Communist

Percent
of Vote

87.5
12.5
85.5
14.5
92.4
7.6
83.3
16.7
97.0
82.0
18.0

Source: Colliers Yearbooks, 7975-84, "Portugal" (New York: Collier-Macmillan),
pp. 439,449,454,447,450,434,440,435.
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Worst-Case NATO Scenario

The collapse of NATO armies following a Soviet attack on Western
Europe and a quick overrunning of Europe north of the Pyrenees is cer
tainly close to a worst-case scenario if not it. The scenario itself,
however, is just one of many, including those with more favorable out
comes. The problem is to estimate the odds of the worst occurring.
If military planners believe the odds to be long, then a good case
exists for allocating the preponderance of NATO military expenditures
to forces in place in West Germany to effectively absorb an initial at
tack and ultimately turn it back. In a broad sense, that is the goal of
NATO and U.S. policy in 1984 and a part of the rationale for significant
increases in recent U.S. defense budgets.
However, no one is that sure of the odds, and military planners
cannot have it both ways - on the one hand, asserting it is extremely
unlikely that NATO armies will be pushed out of Europe, and on the
other, urging a buildup of Alliance forces to prevent that unstated
possi bi Iity from occurring.
In the context of a war fought with conventional weapons, at least,
the figures suggest the odds against a worst-case scenario occurring are
not that long. Table Ill contrasts NATO and Warsaw military man
power in 1983. And while the total numbers seem reasonably close, it
is really the forces in Europe and essentially in place that count.
In the context of forces in place, a more realistic picture is provided
by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 13

Manpower
Tanks
Combat aircraft
Helicopters

NATO
2.6 million
13,000
2,975
1,800

Warsaw Pact
4.0 million
42,500
7,240
1,000

The problem since the formation of NATO is how to move to West
Germany large forces and their equipment located some distance from
Northern Europe, the United States in particular.
Whether sufficient troops and equipment can be transported in
time to stabilize a West German front is unknown. However, the
possibility of failure does exist. And for a relatively small amount of
money and planning, the logical fallback position can be significantly
improved. That position is to hold the entire Iberian peninsula if possi
ble, and Portugal at all costs.
9

TABLE Ill
Active Armed Forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact Countries, 1983

•

NATO
United States
Belgium
Britain
Canada
Denmark
France
Federal Republic
Germany
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
PORTUGAL
Spain*
Turkey

WARSAW PACT
2,136,400
94,717
320,623
82,858
30,700
492,850
495,000

Soviet Union
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
German Democratic
Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania

185,000
373,100
720
102,957
43,170
63,500
347,000
569,000

5,050,000
162,000
204,500
167,000
105,000
340,000
189,500
6,128,000

5,337,595
Source: Air Force Association, Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84
(Washington, D.C.: Air Force Association, December 1983), pp. 74-91.
*Spain joined NATO in June 1982. In December 1982, the Spanish government
ordered a freeze on integrating Spain's forces into the NATO Alliance.

Would Portugal See Itself as the last line of NATO Defense?
Portugal in 1984 is a country at peace. Its most serious problems
are economic. There are no territorial disagreements with the ancient
enemy Spain. Differences that exist between the Iberian neighbors are
basically economic and although serious, are not likely to lead to con
flict.14 Differences between the military and political leaders tend to be
resolved in the accepted Western tradition of supremacy of civilian
control. For example, in November 1983, General Garcia dos Santos,
Army Chief of Staff, publicly stated that the attitude of the (Portuguese)
government "knifes the military" and that its new attitude has "altered
the quality of the armed forces.'' The incident was front page news.
Pro-NATO Defense Minister Mota Pinto and Prime Minister Mario
Soares refused to publicly comment on the episode. General Santos
had made his point, and within a few days his replacement had
peaceably been named. 15
While the West Germans consistently visualize their country as the
major battleground in a NATO-PACT conflict, the Portuguese see a
NATO war as a far-removed contingency. And although they deplore
military rule in Communist Poland and shared the world's revulsion
when the Soviet Union shot down a Korean Airlines 747 in late 1983,
as a people, they do not feel directly threatened. This attitude fairly
10

raises the question of whether Portugal would remain faithful to the
alliance should the main theater of war shift to the Iberian peninsula.
The best answer is to pose another question. What options exist other
than to fight?
In this regard, it is assumed the Soviet Union would not be likely to
offer even a Vichey France-type peace to Spain and Portugal should
NATO resistance collapse north of the Pyrenees, thereby risking the
possibility of these countries becoming a staging area for a NATO
reconquest of Western Europe. Rather, I argue that following a victory
in Northern Europe, PACT forces would regroup, if necessary, and in
vade Iberia. Thus, the war would come to Portugal like it or not.
Should Iberia become the main theater of war, the present small
Portuguese military force would be of little help in stabilizing a front in
either Spain or Portugal. 16 Table IV shows the decline in numbers of
Portugal's armed forces since 1972. I earlier noted the need for re
equipping these forces.
TABLE IV
Portugal's Armed Forces, 1972-83
Year

Army

Navy

Air Force

1972
73
74
75
76

175,000
180,000
179,000
179,000
179,000
36,000
40,000
37,000
37,000
37,000
41 ,000
41 ,000

20,000
18,000
19,500
19,500
19,500
12,800
14,000
14,000
13,040
13,040
13,426
13,000

18,000
21 ,000
18,500
18,500
18,500
10,000
10,000
9,500
9,500
9,500
12,000
9,500

77

78
79
80
81
82
83

National
Guard

Para
military

9,700
9,700
9,700
29,900
29,400
31 ,850
31 ,850
36,300
38,243
37,276

Source: Colliers Yearbook 1973-1984, "Portugal " (New York: Collier-Macmillan) ,
pp. 468,442, 435, 43~ 44~ 454, 447, 450, 43~ 440, 435, 519.

Another question is whether NATO forces and their equipment
could be extracted from continental Europe and redeployed to Iberia
in numbers sufficient to hold an Iberian front without a significant
Portuguese contribution . If such a contingency has ever been "gamed,"
the infinite number of assumptions that would have to be made, coupled
with the myriad number of probabilities to be calculated, would make
any conclusion highly suspect. In truth , we don't know.
If a worst-case scenario comes to pass and the quick redeployment
of any significant number of NATO forces from Northern Europe to
Iberia is held unlikely, then it will be the Portuguese, and hopefully
11

Spanish, forces in place that will determine whether a "European"
front can be maintained until the full military might of the Allies can be
brought to bear.• At the same time, it must be recognized that
Portugal's present lack of military capability would be a negative factor
influencing that nation's willingness to support a NATO stand in Iberia.
Developing a Geostrategic Portugal Defense Policy

In 1984, the Portuguese armed forces stand at 63,000 men ex
cluding paramilitary forces. The country, one of the poorest in NATO
in terms of per capita income, spent 3.3 percent of its gross domestic
product on its military, a somewhat higher percent than the NATO
average. Table V indicates defense expenditures and per capita in
come data for NATO countries.
TABLE V
NATO Defense Expenditures as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product
and NATO Nations Per Capita Incomes
Percent GDP
Belgium
Britain
Canada
Denmark
France
Federal German Republic
Greece
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
PORTUGAL
Spain
Turkey
United States
Average . .. . .. . . . .. . ..... . . . . . . .
Average, w /o U.S . . . ......... .. .. .

Per Capita Income

3.3
5.1
2.0
2.0
4.1
4.3
6.7
2.6
1.2
3.3
3.0
3.3
2.6
5.2
7.2

$ 9,810

3.28
3.00

$ 8,599

9,280
11,356
11,399
10,552
11,097
3,890
6,100
10,785
9,830
13,915
2,370
4,228
1,291
13,154

Sources: Air Force Association , Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/ 84
(Washington , D.C.: Air Force Association , December 1983), p. 139; The World Fact
Book 1983; U.S. Department of State, Background Notes , 1983.

The major conclusion one can draw from Table Vis that if Portugal
is going to reequip and expand its military forces, the undertaking will
have to be externally funded. Assuming external funding is made
available, what difficulties, political and economic, must be overcome?
First, the Salazar legacy must be recognized and dealt with. Essen
tially, it is that a large active duty military force would be politically
unacceptable to any of Portugal's major political parties today.
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Second, over the long term, the Portuguese must come to accept
their armed services as a part of society - not apart from it.
Third, if in a poor country, being a member of the military forces
becomes a way to better economic opportunities, then membership
must be open to all. No economic or social constraint must bar the
way.
Fourth, granting that general population identification with the
armed services is important, such identification is doubly important
with respect to the officer corps.
Fifth, agreements must be negotiated that would allow reasonable
levels of equipment and material to be prepositioned in Portugal.
Consider the problems in order. If a large, active duty military
force is ruled out for political reasons, the only remaining alternative is
a well-trained and equipped citizen reserve.
On paper, Portugal is held to have a reserve force of some 90,000
men.17 However, the numbers, age, training status, condition of call
up, and state of equipment is highly questionable. A number of senior
Army officers heavily discount any contribution the reserve might
make to military preparedness. In any event, if the active duty forces
are badly in need of new equipment as is the case today, the condition
of the reserves in this regard can, at best, be only marginal.
A common thread ties together the other points made above. It is
that any armed service, active duty or reserve, must be viewed as being
"of the nation" in every sense of the term. In practice, it means that if
completion of a secondary school education and/or attendance at
institutions of higher education is foreclosed to an otherwise qualified
individual for whatever reason, be it lack of ability to pay or the con
straint of limited places, and a mditary career requires specific educa
tional attainments for entry, retention, and advancement, then the
military services must be prepared to fund and offer the needed educa
tion, in-house if necessary.
Should the European NATO nations, the United States, and
Canada agree that Portugal is strategically more important to the
alliance than heretofore realized, and that increasing the country's
military capability is money well spent, then several actions/programs
should have a high priority.
First, reequipping the present active duty military force of 63,000
men must continue. In the process, however, every effort must be
made to hold the present force level reasonably constant. Reequipping
should not become a rationale for any significant active force expan
sion. Rather, the active duty forces should be the nucleus around
which a larger reserve force is built.
The second action is to prune the present reserve force. In final
form, it would be composed of educated, well-trained volunteers
receiving reserve pay. Of all NATO countries, the United States has the
greatest experience with voluntary reserve forces and would become .
the role mode1. 1 a
13

Specific projects that should be funded include upgrading the
present service academies (Army, Navy, Air Force) to full degree
granting i nstitutions. 19 At present, these institutions do not have
authority to grant the baccalaureate degree. In this respect, it is ax
iomatic that if the academies are to have a fair share of Portugal's
brightest young people, then the granting of a recognized academic
degree, in addition to military instructions, is a requirement. In this
regard, a program model is already in place. In 1984, the Agency for In
ternational Development is funding capital improvements and the
education of Portuguese faculty in the United States at three Por
tuguese institutions of higher learning - Evora University, lnstituto
Universitario de Beira Interior, and lnstituto Universitario de Tras-os
Montes e Alto Douro. 20
To provide officers for a relatively large reserve force, the
American ROTC experience is again a worthy model.
Since the 1974 revolution, Portugal has doubled the number of in
stitutions granting baccalaureate degrees. None, however, have any
semblance of a military presence on their campuses, i.e., a formal
ROTC-like program. Also lacking is a program in which civilian lec
turers are brought to the military academies on a continuing basis. The
funding of a number of ROTC units at civilian universities to meet the
demands of an expanded reserve force is a high priority goal.
Today, Portugal's Army has a good school for training its noncom
missioned officers. 21 However, this school must be expanded, as must
counterpart schools in other services.
Finally, a reserve force is only as good as its training, and training is
only as good as hands-on experience with first-line equipment. In this
respect, as a part of their commitment, reserves must be prepared to at
tend summer camps to attain this proficiency. Training with wooden
rifles and mock tanks, as was the case of the United States in 1940, is
not an option in 1984.
Conclusion

What would be the end result if NATO planners upgrade the
strategic role of Portugal as suggested in this lecture? Most important,
an active duty armed force of about 70,000 men, backed by a well
trained and equipped reserve force of 80,000, would be in place to
support a NATO defense line in Iberia should the need ever arise. As
might be expected, the largest component of this force would be army
reservists. This 150,000-man Portuguese force would be the nucleus
around which NATO reinforcements would be deployed.
Every option to strengthen NATO has a price tag attached, and in
1984 with American defense (and NATO) budgets squarely "under the
gun," the cost of upgrading Portugal's military capability cannot be
overlooked.
14

In 1982, Portugal spent an estimated $630 million on its armed
forces. 22 This works out to approximately $10,000 for each man on
active duty. By an admittedly rough calculation, to increase the active
forces to 70,000 and maintain a reserve of 80,000 would cost approx
imately $470 million annually.
In FY 1982, Portugal was granted $42.5 million under the Foreign
Military Sales Program (FMS), $20.4 million under the Military
Assistance Program (MAP), and $2.2 million under the International
Military Education and Training Program for a total of $65.1 million.
Under the Azores base agreement negotiated in 1983, U.S. aid will in
crease to $145 million. A part of this increase could be earmarked for
an expanded reserve force.
In considering additional military funding for Portugal, it is often
helpful to examine an expenditure in the context of alternative uses. In
this respect, $470 million would buy one-fourth of one Trident sub
marine, one-third of a guided missile cruiser, or 2.2 MX missiles. Alter
natively, to implement and fund the Portuguese reserve force described
here for the next seven years, NATO wou Id have to give up 1 Trident
submarine and 1 guided missile cruiser.
It has been often said "prepare for the worst and hope for the
best." I would change that slightly and assert "prepare for the worst,
and diminish the chance of the worst occurring." Stated another way,
an Iberian defense in-depth capability might go a long way to deter a
Soviet attack on Europe in the first place.

15

Appendix

TABLE VI
Reserve Forces as Percent of U .S. Armed Services, 1982
ARMY

Combat Divisions
Separate Brigades
Special Forces
Armor Battalions
Field Artillery Battalions
Conventional Ammunition Compan ies
Light Equipment Maintenance Com panies
Training Divisions

Active

Reserve &
National Guard

65%
20
40
55
40
25
8
0

35
80
60
45
60
75
92
100

85
70
62
15
0

15
30
38
85
100

35
70
80
65
55
32
48

65
30
20
35
45
68
52

65
65
50
60
60

35
35
50
40
40

N AV Y

Carrier Air Wings
Intelligence Units
Construction Battalions
Minesweeps
CONUS-Based Logistical Aircraft
and Combat S & R
AI R FORCE

CONUS Air Defense Interceptors
Tactical Fighters
Aerial Refueling
Rescue Recovery
Strategic Airlift Crews
Tactical Airlift
Tactical Reconnaissance
MARI NES

Combat Division
Air Wings
Force Reconnaissance Companies
Heavy Artillery Batteries
Tank Battalions

Source: U.S., Department of Defense, Defense 83 Almanac (Arlington, Va.:
Department of Defense, 1983), pp. 16-17.

Footnotes
1 "NATO's Dilemma: Stopping Russia Without Nuclear Weapons," U.S. News
and World Report, December 12, 1983, p. 41.
2While this lecture considers only the role of Portugal in a worst-case scenario, it
is not implied that Norway is of any less importance. The difference is in the different
roles each would play. The scenario described might or might not include the use of
tactical nuclear weapons.
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3 Hammond, Paul Y., et. al., The Reluctant Supplier, U.S. Decision-making For
Arms Sales (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hair, 1983), p. 17.

4 "U.S., Portugal Sign Agreements on Strategic Base," Wall Street Journal,
December 14, 1983, p. 3.
5 "Reequipamento militar tern de ser acautelado," Diario de Noticias, 5 Dezembro
1983, p. 1.
6 "Portugal esta na primeira linha de defesa da NATO," Correia da Manha, 9
Setembro 1983, p. 9.
7
Disputes in the Iberian peninsula and Northwest Africa include the issue of
Spain's claim to sovereignty over British-held Gibraltar, the issue of Spanish sovereignty
over its enclaves of Centa and Meli Ila in North Africa, and anti-government guerrillas in
Morocco supported by Algeria and Libya.
8The potential for Spain providing a defense-in-depth to the NATO alliance was
noted in "The Security of the Atlantic, Iberian and North African Regions," report on a
conference held May 9-10 in Lisbon sponsored by the Institute for Strategic and Inter
national Studies and The lnstitutue For Foreign Policy Analysis.
9The sixth centenary of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was celebrated in Lisbon in
1973 with Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, in attendance.
10 1t was during this period that the Portuguese army was reorganized under the
direction of British Marshall William Beresford. The Victors, edited by Brigadier Peter
Young (London: Hamlyn Publishing Group, 1981), p. 25.
11 The U.S. Portuguese agreement grants base rights to U.S. forces for out-of-theater
contingencies on a case-by-case basis.
12 "France," Colliers Yearbook 1982 (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1982), pp. 260-61.
In the 1983 French municipal elections, the electorate shifted to the right with rightist
parties receiving 51 percent of the vote.
13 "NATO's Dilemma: Stopping Russia Without Nuclear Weapons," p. 41.
14 Major economic problems include a heavy trade imbalance favoring Spain,
Spanish tariff barriers against Portuguese products, and disagreement over the present
arrangements governing Spanish fishing rights in_ Portuguese territorial waters.
15 Diario de Noticias, 19 Novembro 1983, p. 1.
16 Portugal, however, has some natural defensive advantages based on its rugged
terrain, particularly the Serra da Estrela mountains in the central region of the country.
' 7Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84, p. 90.
18 U.S. reserve forces as well as the American ROTC program is discussed in "The
Recruitment and Education of the American Officer Corps. Can Lessons Learned
Benefit Portugal's Armed Services?" by Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr., Working Paper Series
WP 122883, Strom Thurmond Institute for Public Policy Research, December 1983.
19 This issue is discussed in "Relatorio da Commissao Nomeada Para O Estudo da
lnsercao da Escola Naval, Academia Militar e Academia da Force Aerea no Esquema
Geral donsino Superior" (Report of Standards Committee on the Study to Include the
Naval School, the Military Academy, and Air Force Academy in the General Plan of
Higher Education). (Unpublished mimeographed report, 1983).
20 A beginning in upgrading Portuguese military academies to degree granting in
stitutions would be the establishment of a program whereby instructors at these schools
could attend U.S. universities and earn advanced degrees in their respective fields in
the same manner in which the AID program is upgrading faculties at civilian institu
tions.
21 The Army School for non-commissioned officers is located at Caldas da Rainha.
Nomination to the two-year program is from enlisted ranks and is by examination.
22 Air Force Magazine: The Military Balance 1983/84, p. 90.
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